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As economic games have spread from experimental economics
to other social sciences, so too have critiques of their usefulness
for drawing inferences about the ‘real world’. What these
criticisms often miss is that games can be used to reveal
individuals’ private preferences in ways that observational
and interview data cannot; furthermore, economic games can
be designed such that they do provide insights into real-
world behaviour. Here, we draw on our collective experience
using economic games in field contexts to illustrate how
researchers can strategically alter the framing or design of
economic games to draw inferences about private-world or
real-world preferences. A detailed case study from coastal
Colombia provides an example of the subtleties of game
design and how games can be combined fruitfully with self-
report data. We close with a list of concrete recommendations
for how to modify economic games to better match particular
research questions and research contexts.1. Introduction
Over the last three decades, economic games have become an
important part of the toolkits of social scientists. Originating in
experimental economics in the 1970s and 1980s [1], researchers
initially designed economic games to isolate particular features
of real-world rules or norms, such as those observed in




2game to those predicted by economic theory [2]. Economists have a high bar for establishing causality, so
in order to investigate the causal relationship between experimental1 manipulations and participant
behaviour, economists designed their games to be highly internally valid—that is, standardized and
repeatable [7–9]. Given this initial emphasis on internal validity, it is perhaps unsurprising that
economic games have been criticized in economics for their lack of external validity, or
generalizability to situations beyond that of the experiment [7,10]. As economic games have made
their way into the toolkits of other disciplines, such as anthropology and psychology, this criticism
has become more widespread [11–13]. Critics have argued that the rules and norms that inspired
classical economic games may not apply outside of large-scale market economies [12,13] or be
relevant to theoretical questions beyond bargaining [7,11]. More generally, there is an increasing
consensus that researchers should not use the standard suite of economic games just because they are
‘standardized’ [9] or ‘paradigmatic’ [9,14].
Abandoning economic games as a methodological tool on the basis of these critiques, however,
would be a mistake. Economic games are useful precisely because researchers can tailor the
experimental design of these games to reflect relevant features of the real world, including those
specific to a local context [15,16]. Furthermore, researchers can design games such that they minimize
(though not eliminate) real-world constraints—for example, those posed by resource limitations
(individuals simply may not have extra resources to give to others) or the reputational consequences
of real-world behaviour (individuals may have preferences to be stingy that they are unable to express
in daily life)—revealing participants’ private preferences in a way that observational and interview
data may not. In the present paper, we argue for the extended use of economic games alongside other
social science methods. We focus on the potential of modified game designs, and we review studies
that we have conducted in collaboration with societies around the globe. We describe in detail a case
study from Colombia that demonstrates both how experimental data can be an important complement
to observational and self-report data [17] (cf. [10]) and why careful experimental design is key to
making inferences about either private-world or real-world preferences. We close with suggestions for
how researchers can modify classical economic games to better reflect their research questions and the
features of the real world relevant to their studies.1.1. Validity in what external context?
In most economic games, researchers provide participants with money—ranging from the equivalent of a
few minutes’ work to a day’s wages or more [18]—and ask them to decide how much to keep for
themselves and how much to allocate to third parties (the recipients). Under some experimental
designs, such as that of the Ultimatum Game (see [14] for a review), recipients can respond to the
decisions made by the focal participant (the decider); under others, such as that of the Dictator Game
(see [9]), recipients cannot respond (see figure 1 for an illustration). Decisions are usually made in
private, without the researcher watching, and recorded afterwards. Deciders and recipients usually
receive their payouts immediately.
Many critiques of experimental games claim that they fail to reflect important features of the real
world—that is, they lack ecological validity (see [19] for a discussion). These critiques, especially those
originating in anthropology and psychology, usually take one of two forms. The first focuses on the
concept of anonymity in classical economic games. In an effort to minimize concerns with
reciprocation or reputation, classical games like the Ultimatum and Dictator Games are typically
played anonymously, so that deciders and recipients do not learn each other’s identity [1,20]. Some
critics argue that in small towns or in subsistence-scale societies where interactions with anonymous
others are rare, this aspect of game design does not reflect participants’ daily lives [21]. Furthermore,
participants know that only a subset of their community is playing the game, and that their fellow
players must be among these individuals, undermining researchers’ attempts to emulate anonymity.
The second critique of the ecological validity of economic games concerns how games are described
to participants. To avoid biasing deciders’ decisions, many classical economic games present participants1Though not all economic game studies are ‘experiments’ in the strictest sense, involving the manipulation of an independent variable
[3], in principle games are experimental because they afford such manipulation. For example, researchers can test the effects of
punishment on generosity [4] or compare anonymous and non-anonymous treatments (see relevant discussion in §2.2). Even
without different treatments, economic games fit the less-stringent definitions of ‘experiments’ in areas of psychology (see
discussion in [5]) and in experimental economics [6]. As such, we follow custom in experimental economics and refer to games as
experiments here.
decider recipient
In the Dictator and
Ultimatum Games,  
decider is given money by
the experimenter 1
decider chooses whether to allocate
money to the recipient and how much2
recipient cannot respond3
In the Dictator Game, In the Ultimatum Game, 
recipient can accept or
reject the money; if rejects,
neither gets any money
3
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Figure 1. The basic structure of the Dictator and Ultimatum Games. For further details about each of these classical games, see





with minimalistic descriptions of the task, avoiding real-world analogies or terms like ‘donation’ or ‘gift’
[22]. As in most experiments, the results generated by economic games are sensitive to the framing of the
experiment—the way researchers describe and present the experiment to participants [23,24]. Results
from games framed with real-world analogies can differ substantially from those without such
framing [24–26]. When instructions are minimalistic, it is unclear what real-world analogies or lived
experiences participants draw on to guide their decision-making [11,12,16,27,28], muddying
interpretations of the data.
Concerns about how anonymity and framing impact economic game play are not unfounded, but
these are limitations intrinsic to many experiments, not only to economic games. The ecological
validity of games hinges entirely on the contexts to which the results are meant to map. In other
words, what is meant by the ‘real world’ [6]? Does the ‘real world’ refer to behaviour in market
interactions? To behaviour in houses of worship? To behaviour in situations requiring cooperative
labour? Just as we should not expect observational data collected in one context to generalize to
another context—a central tenet of cultural anthropology—we should not expect data from one
experimental context to generalize to an untold number of real-world contexts [22,29]—a central tenet
of cross-cultural psychology. Experimental studies are normally designed to evaluate theory [15], not
mimic the real world.
Critiques of the ecological validity of economic games do suggest that games must be used with
explicit consideration of their affordances—not just because they are ‘standardized’ or ‘paradigmatic’.
This includes consideration of: (i) whether the game design can address a particular research question,
(ii) whether the research goal is inference about preferences under minimal constraints or about
preferences under real-world constraints, and (iii) whether the game will be understandable to, and
conceptualized similarly by, all participants. For example, behaviour in anonymous games may reveal
an individual’s cooperative preferences [30] absent concern for recipient characteristics (e.g. how nice
they seem) or reciprocal obligations (e.g. ‘I owe them one’) and may plausibly reflect local norms for
behaviour during interactions with strangers [31]. By contrast, games in which the decider is
anonymous but the recipient is not may reveal decider preferences conditional on recipient
characteristics and relational characteristics (e.g. past disagreements between the decider and the
recipient), revealing how cooperative behaviour is structured by interpersonal sentiments [16].
Furthermore, games in which neither the decider nor the recipient are anonymous may reveal decider
preferences to make a positive first impression on a stranger [32,33].
In the next section, we demonstrate how anonymity and experimental framing can strategically be
modified to reveal different participant preferences, with illustrations from our own experimental
r
4work. We focus separately on the measurement of private-world preferences—what participants would
do given minimal constraints—and on measuring preferences in real-world relationships.oyalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:1920902. Altering classical games to answer new questions
2.1. A private world: measuring preferences in the context of minimal constraints
The notion of ‘preferences’, or the (often ranked) importance people give to different things or
actions, can provide insights into the nature of human decision-making—even a window into the
evolutionary history of human decision-making [23,34,35]. This is not to say that these preferences are
independent of cultural influence [36]: many factors may contribute to an individual’s preferences,
including their sentiments—their attitudes and emotions towards particular people [37] (see also
[38,39]); their assets, such as their perceived socio-economic status [32] and their housing and food
security [40]; and values they have acquired from social transmission and internalized, such as moral
culture (notions of what makes other people good or bad [41]). Importantly, individuals cannot
always act according to their preferences in real life due to constraints on their behaviour from
cultural institutions and social obligations (e.g. when money is requested, one must share [42,43]).
In other words, social structure constrains an individual’s agency with consequences, foregrounding
some preferences and masking others [44]. Because of this, researchers may have difficulty using
observational or self-report data to study participant preferences with minimal constraints—i.e. their
private-world preferences. Observational data generally reflect only what individuals are able to do
given real-life constraints, such as resource and time availability, the expectations of family or
community members, and institutional sanctions. Furthermore, social desirability concerns can colour
self-report data. Participants may not wish to reveal socially unacceptable preferences to the
researcher—for example, it is much cheaper to say that one always shares than it is to forgo a half
day’s wages to do so.
Experimental techniques, including economic games, are a useful tool for reducing the effects of
external constraints on behaviour and attenuating social desirability biases, improving our insight into
private preferences—how participants would behave if they could. Allocation games like the Dictator
Game are particularly good at capturing private preferences, because they give deciders more agency
than do games that allow recipients to respond [9,45,46]: when making allocation decisions, deciders
do not need to use their own resources, acquired outside the experimental context [47], nor anticipate
how recipients [48], third parties or the researcher will react to their decisions [20,49].
B.G.P. and A.C.P. have used two different allocation games to measure deciders’ preferences with
respect to recipients with whom they only rarely interact. While rare interactions are difficult to
capture with observational data—as they may not take place during a field season—or with interview
data—as they may not be salient enough in the context of the interview to be recalled and reported
by participants [50,51]—experimental methods can allow researchers a window into these infrequent
encounters. Furthermore, both B.G.P. and A.C.P. asked participants to make their allocation decisions
in private to minimize the risk of self-presentation bias.
B.G.P. and colleagues used what they call a random allocation game (RAG) [40] to test whether moral
values and belief in morally concerned deities affect rule-following [41,52–56]. Deciders played two
games. In one game, participants were presented with two cups: one representing an anonymous
same-community co-ethnic, co-religionist individual, and one representing a geographically distant co-
ethnic, co-religionist individual. In the other game, the cups represented the decider (self ) and a
separate co-ethnic, co-religious individual from the same distant community. Researchers presented
deciders with 30 coins and a fair, six-sided die with three sides of one colour and three sides of
another. They asked deciders to mentally choose a cup and a colour, then to roll the die 30 times in
private, without the researcher watching; if the chosen colour was rolled, deciders were told to put a
coin into their chosen cup, and if the other colour was rolled, they were told to put the coin into the
other cup (figure 2). If deciders did not break game rules to put more coins in one cup instead of the
other, half of the 30 coins would end up in each cup on average. Because decisions were made in
private and recipients could not respond, deciders could act according to their private preferences to
either favour their local community or to allocate fairly. The RAG allowed researchers to examine the
role of religion—and, more specifically, belief in morally concerned, punitive deities—in widening the
sphere of human cooperation to include geographically distant, co-religionists as if they were
members of one’s local community.
decider receiver
Figure 2. Set-up for the RAG including coins, cups and a fair, two-coloured die (illustrated here with spots instead of colours). All
money left in each cup was distributed to one randomly selected individual described on that cup (e.g. someone from the same
community, same religion and same ethnic group).
Daniel Alfredo Jesus Ronaldo Samuel Cristian
Figure 3. Set-up of the experiment in Bolivia, with the simultaneous presentation of photos of ingroup and outgroup strangers (e.g.
ingroup, three on left; outgroup, three on right) and initial allocation of coins (decider was also allocated three coins, not pictured)





Studying individuals’ preferences for outgroup versus ingroup relationships, A.C.P. and Michael
Gurven used an experimental paradigm in which recipients were strangers, but members of either the
decider’s ethnolinguistic/religious group or a different ethnolinguistic/religious group [33]. Members
of one of the three Bolivian populations with whom A.C.P. collaborates, the Tsimane’, have minimal
access to roads or to cheap river transportation; because of this, Tsimane’ individuals have only
infrequent interactions with members of other ethnolinguistic groups [32], making these interactions
difficult to capture via observational study designs. Furthermore, when intergroup interactions do
occur, the Tsimane’ often self-report suffering discrimination [57]. Given the rarity of intergroup
interactions, A.C.P. attempted to approximate a first-time interaction across group boundaries using a
non-anonymous allocation game: deciders were simultaneously presented with photos of ingroup and
outgroup strangers and learned the name and group membership of each (figure 3); recipients learned
the first and last name and group membership of those who gave them money. Tsimane’ deciders
were 60% less likely to give a coin to a recipient from a group they perceived as having good market
access, allocating more money to other Tsimane’ recipients instead [33]. In post-game interviews,
deciders frequently indicated that they preferred to allocate coins to recipients who were in greater
need, consistent with the common view among the Tsimane’ that the Tsimane’ have fewer resources
than other ethnolinguistic groups in Bolivia [33]. A study based only on observational and self-report
data might simply attribute the infrequent interactions between the Tsimane’ and other ethnic groups
to discrimination or lack of mobility. While both of these factors may play a role, this experimental
paradigm reveals that Tsimane’ preferences may also be influenced by need, such that they prefer to
channel money towards those they feel need it most—other Tsimane’.
2.2. A real world: measuring preferences in the context of real-world constraints
In a given study, social scientists may not want to know about individuals’ preferences with minimal
influence from real-world constraints—how they would behave if they could—but instead may want




6participants’ behaviour in experiments is treated as a proxy for how they behave in the real world. For
example, economic games are useful for testing the assumptions of applied interventions (e.g.
establishing a protected fishery) before or during project implementation [58,59]. Games permit
inferences about how individuals behave in light of local cultural institutions, like those governing
interactions with strangers [31,60] or with members of other ethnic groups [48,61–63]. Games can also
reveal how an individual’s preferences reflect the qualities of their social partners. Studies like these—
what we call the real-world approach—are unfortunately often conflated with the private-world
approach: just as private-world research is critiqued for not approximating the real world (§2.1), real-
world research is critiqued for inadequately testing theory (see [8] for discussion), even though that is
not what it is designed to test.
To understand how individual characteristics structure real-world social relationships on the island of
Yasawa in Fiji, M.M.G. developed three recipient identity-conditioned heuristics (RICH) games [16]. In
these games, researchers present deciders with a photo array of same-community members (figure 4).
In an allocation game, researchers give deciders coins and deciders must choose how to allocate these
coins across recipients, including themselves; in a taking game, researchers distribute coins across
recipient photos and deciders must choose whether or not to take coins from the recipients; and in a
costly reduction game, deciders are given coins and must choose whether or not to pay to reduce the
total amount a recipient receives. RICH games reveal how a decider’s preferences to give to, exploit or
punish a particular recipient reflect the decider’s characteristics (e.g. their resources), the recipient’s
characteristics (e.g. their reputation) and properties of the dyad (e.g. kinship and friendship).
When playing these games in Fiji, almost all participants provided rationales for their decisions that
were consistent with M.M.G.’s observational work, including a desire to help the ‘weak’ and punish
‘moneyheads’. Furthermore, parallels between the games and the real world were not lost on
participants. In debriefing interviews, participants were two-to-three times as likely to relate RICH
games to their daily lives as were participants in neighbouring communities who played classical
anonymous games [64]. Multi-level analyses of these data [65] reveal large effects of recipient
reputations, dyadic relationships and interpersonal sentiments on game decisions, factors that drive
everyday village decision-making (e.g. [66]) but are masked in anonymous-recipient games.
Consequently, participants displayed levels of both generosity and punitiveness not observed in
anonymous-recipient games; as decisions were confidential, punitiveness also exceeded that expected
from ethnographic observations.
While designed to tap nominally distinct motives to help (the allocation game), exploit (the taking
game) and punish at a cost (the costly reduction game), the different RICH games also differ subtly in
their parameters. For example, in the allocation game, deciders do not have enough coins to give to
all recipients, but in the taking game, deciders can choose to leave already-distributed coins on every
photo, so that all recipients receive some. In other words, the games entail different degrees of
resource constraint. Such subtle differences in experimental design can affect the degree to which
participants can exhibit real-world or private-world preferences. We illustrate this below with RICH
games data C.T.R. collected in Colombia.3. A private and a real world: ethnicity, wealth, and food insecurity
in Colombia
3.1. Research context
C.T.R. conducts research with an artisanal fishing community of Afrocolombians and Emberá on the
Pacific coast of Colombia. Nearly all of the Emberá and a large proportion of the Afrocolombians in
the community are considered internally displaced persons, affected by Colombia’s internal conflicts.
In the region, a majority of residents are Afrocolombian (82%), followed by Emberá and related
groups (13%), and a small fraction of Mestizos (5%) [67]. Inequality is high in the community, both in
terms of reported income (Gini = 0.47) and material wealth (Gini = 0.40), with poorer individuals
residing on lower-quality land (e.g. on the borders of landfills or on tidal lands). Subsistence for the
Afrocolombian community is based around artisanal fishing, whereas horticulture forms the basis of
Emberá subsistence. Regardless of the ethnic group membership, however, wage labour, hunting,
fishing, horticulture and animal husbandry may all be practised.
Social network questionnaires reveal that most individuals interact primarily within cliques [68]




Figure 4. Illustrations of decisions in progress for the (a) allocation, (b) taking, and (c) costly reduction RICH games; photos are of





help individuals buffer the resource shocks associated with poverty and the resettlement resulting from
forced displacement. Reported resource sharing networks are similar in structure to friendship networks,
indicating that giving is generally structured by social closeness, kinship and distance between
households (figure 5a,b). Note, however, that a fraction of interethnic resource transfer ties may have
friendship resource transfers giving game
reducing gameleaving game (e)
(b)(a) (c)
(d )
Figure 5. Network structure of (a) social relationships, (b) resource transfers, and (c–e) RICH game data. Afrocolombians are plotted
in black and Emberá in blue. Points (also called vertices) represent unique individuals and are scaled by material wealth. Ties (also
called edges) represent social connections or resource/experimental transfers between a pair of individuals; both unidirectional and
bidirectional ties are depicted. Frame (a) illustrates the social relationships between individuals and illustrates the role of ethnicity
and wealth similarity in the structure of these relationships. Frame (b) shows the flow of food and money transfers and illustrates a
rather low density of connections. In frame (c), a higher density of transfers in the RICH game becomes apparent, as every decider
has money available to give should they choose to. Giving remains more common between dyads of the same ethnicity. In frame
(d ), deciders have enough coins to allocate to all recipients, and the resulting density of transfer ties increases. The abundance of
ties reflects that most deciders left money for (i.e. failed to take money from) most recipients. Finally, in frame (e), we see that





been missed; some Afrocolombians reported making small transfers of food or money to Emberá
community residents who asked for these transfers, but whose names the Afrocolombians did not
know (cf. Figure 5b).3.2. RICH game methods
In 2017, C.T.R. administered the RICH game protocols described in §2.2., including the allocation game,
taking game and costly reduction game [16], to 93 individuals (54% female; 76% Afrocolombian).
Recipients were individuals from the same community, including members of the decider’s own
household. He then paired RICH game data with demographic, anthropometric (i.e. body
measurement) and social network data collected in 2016, and designed statistical models to predict a
decider’s behaviour with respect to each candidate recipient. Independent models were used to
predict decider behaviour in each of the three economic games and in a real-world food/money
transfer network (described in §3.1). To model the zero-sum nature of economic games with multiple
recipients (see also [33]), C.T.R. used Bayesian mixed-effect multinomial regressions similar in
structure to the social relations model used by Koster & Leckie [47]. Analyses were coded in Stan [69]
and implemented with the R statistical program (v. 3.6.0, [70]) using the RStan package (v. 2.18.2,
[71]). Results are reported as the mean of the posterior distribution with 90% credible intervals, akin
to confidence intervals. In the interest of space, further methodological details and robusticity checks


































Figure 6. Standardized coefficient estimates for the effects of focal, recipient and dyadic characteristics on the probability of a focal





can be found in the electronic supplementary materials. The code and data used are available at www.
github.com/ctross/preferencesandconstraints.3.3. Real-world and private-world preferences
A comparison of model estimates for the predictors of resource transfers (figure 6, column 1) with those
of game play in the three RICH games (figure 6, columns 2–4) demonstrates both the parallels and key
differences between real-world behaviour and game play. With respect to the parallels, note first the
dyadic measures of perennial interest to social scientists: ethnic affiliation, kinship, friendship, and
reciprocation of cooperative behaviour (rows 3–4). For these predictor variables, we observe
substantial agreement between the effects detected in the allocation game and the effects detected in
the real-world resource transfer network; in both cases, transfers flowed towards co-ethnics, kin and
friends. This provides evidence that economic games, if designed to, can measure behavioural
preferences that ostensibly operate in similar real-world contexts—in this case, motives for sharing
with known members of the community.
The real-world resource transfer network data show that all else equal, resources preferentially flow from
haves to have-nots: elderly, depressed, and food-insecure individuals are less likely tomake resource transfers
to others (presumably due to personal need), and those individuals with high grip strength are less likely to
receive incoming transfers from others (presumably due to higher physical status and less need). A similar
pattern also holds in the economic game data, but important differences emerge because constraints on
behaviour are experimentally relaxed. In the allocation game, food-insecure individuals are just as likely as
everyone else to make transfers to others; the same is true for depressed individuals in the allocation
game. By ensuring that these individuals have resources (coins) that they can transfer to—or leave for—
others if they wish, RICH games permit deciders to act in accordance with their private preferences.
Even more apparent are the effects of recipient characteristics as resource constraints are experimentally
lifted. In the allocation game, deciders prefer to transfer coins to those individuals who are unable to work.
As resource constraints are relaxed further in the taking game, we see preferences to leave coins for those
individuals who cannot work, individuals with food insecurity and indigenous individuals (who generally
are, and are perceived to be, living under tougher circumstances). Moreover, in the taking game, deciders
prefer to take coins from those high in material wealth and those with high grip strength. Similar patterns
abound in the costly reduction game, where elderly, food-insecure and indigenous individuals are less
likely to be punished, and individuals with high material wealth are more likely to be punished (see
also [65]). In the ‘real world’, where agency is constrained, cases where the poor or weak punish the
wealthy or strong might be rare, and thus harder to detect with observational methods. In summary,
these findings show that the relaxation of constraints on behaviour can allow individuals increasing
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rs
10agency with which to act on their private preferences. The extent to which individuals in this dataset prefer
to help marginalized members of their community would be overlooked by restricting the study design to
real-world transfers alone.
In general, RICH games have shown high ecological validity: that is, they map onto the same dyadic
variables that structure empirical resource transfers. However, they also provide deciders with more
freedom to act on their private-world preferences, at least when the game parameters are set such that they
relax real-world constraints, like resource availability. C.T.R. clarified this pattern in post-game interviews:
the majority of respondents, even those in relative marginalization, saw the allocation game, and especially
the taking game, as an opportunity to ‘do the right thing’ and give to those most in need (see also [16]). It
is only through the combination of experimental and self-report data that we can reveal the disconnect
between what participants wish to do and what they can actually do given their circumstances and
competing obligations to friends, kin andmembers of their ownhousehold (see [72,73] for related discussion). os
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:1920904. How do we better design games to test our research questions?
The four studies discussed above are not flawless examples of how to best use economic games, but they are
instructive. We have learned from their shortcomings and surprises, and these lessons may be useful for
others who wish to use economic games to measure private-world or real-world preferences. As we
identified in §1, some primary considerations for researchers running economic games should be: (i) the
match between research questions and experimental design, (ii) the extent to which researchers wish to
make inferences about real-world versus private-world preferences, and (iii) whether the experimental
task will be comprehensible to participants—which is especially relevant when exporting an economic
game from one cultural context to another. We highlight different strategies for addressing these
considerations below. We also discuss these strategies in light of replicability, emphasizing the
importance of conceptual replication.
4.1. Consideration 1: research questions first, game design second
To avoid a common criticism of the use of economic games, we recommend formulating hypotheses or
research questions before selecting methodological tools. It may be tempting to use classical economic
games because they have been used by many other researchers—e.g. because they are ‘standardized’
[9] and ‘paradigmatic’ [9,14]. However, without consideration of how theory motivates the choice of
method, it may be difficult to interpret experimental results, and this may encourage post hoc
theorizing. Best practice includes being deliberate in one’s choice of methods: methods should be
appropriate for the research questions at hand, and this may require modifying existing tools,
including classical economic games. For example, if you are interested in eliciting private-world levels
of trust between ethnic groups, economic games may provide different insights than do self-report
methods (see [74,75] for relevant discussion). However, if you hypothesize that threat affects trust
between ethnic groups, the classical Trust Game [76] may not sufficiently capture this aspect of the
real world; instead, consider modifying the game design so that threat is a salient part of the game [77].
4.2. Consideration 2: what does ‘real world’ mean, and do you want to measure
real-world preferences?
As we illustrated in §§2 and 3, games can reveal private-world or real-world preferences. If you wish to
draw inferences about real-world preferences, then relevant features of the real world need to be
represented in the game—that is, the game must be ecologically valid, at least with respect to the
context to which you wish to extrapolate (the focal context) [78]. To ensure the focal context is salient
to participants, we recommend including it in the game design, a technique that has been successfully
used by a number of researchers in a variety of locations [16,26,28,79,80]. For example, if the focal
context is a cooperative institution, consider explicitly framing the experiment in terms of that
institution [24] and/or mimicking the institution in the design of the game [79]. If real-world
relationships or rare or hard-to-observe interactions are part of your research focus, consider revealing
some characteristics of the recipients to the decider—for example, identifying recipients by name,
photo [16,32,33], or group or community membership [52]. If everyday generosity is of interest, rather
than giving participants a windfall of free money for game play, consider designing the game such




11By establishing a principled means of quantitatively or qualitatively measuring the focal context,
it becomes easier to compare experimental results with participants’ real-world behaviour.
Observational [21] and survey data are the most readily available options, but other data sources (e.g.
audits of local records [59]) may be relevant as well. Though the magnitudes of effects may differ
when comparing analyses of game data with analyses of observational or survey data, the direction of
effects should be consistent if the game design reflects the focal context [17].
We also recommend including post-game questions asking participants what they thought the game
was about [13,16,25,79]. If participants respond that the game was about the focal context, these data
support the effectiveness of your manipulation (that is, its construct validity); if the focal context was
invoked in the game design rather than in the game instructions, participants should likewise mention
that context in their responses. Sometimes, unforeseen interpretations of the game that emerge in post-
game questions will be frequent enough to warrant post hoc consideration (e.g. when games remind
participants of putting money in the charity box at a temple, deciders might give more [54]).
If instead of real-world preferences you are attempting to measure private-world preferences, be deliberate
about which constraints on real-world behaviour you will experimentally relax. For example, providing coins
for game play can relax resource constraints—revealing, for example, reciprocity or need-based generosity—
while making decisions confidential can relax reputational concerns—revealing, for example, punitiveness.
Measures of the focal context and post-game questions can work in synergy with these manipulations.
Post-game interviews can function like a manipulation check; participants may even tell you if they are
acting on their private-world preferences (see C.T.R.’s experience in §3.3 for an example).
4.3. Consideration 3: know the community
Time spent on the ground—that is, observing and interacting with community members—permits
researchers to substantially improve their game design and to more easily interpret their results. Time
spent with a community can give you a sense for which methods will be most appropriate to test
your research question. For example, to make the game relevant for participants, you may find it
helpful to use a currency other than money (e.g. [82,83]). Furthermore, the more you know about the
community, the better you will be able to interpret your results—something that is true regardless of
the population with whom you are collaborating, even if you are studying undergraduates (see [3] for
an example).2 If you are limited in the time you can spend with a community, consider reading
additional materials about the area to learn about the local context.3
Instead of relying solely on post-game questions, researchers can also assess how their game design
reflects (or does not reflect) daily life by conducting a pilot with a small sample of individuals—a sample
as representative as possible of the backgrounds, genders, ages, etc. of the community with whom they
are collaborating. We recommend paying special attention to what pilot participants find perplexing or
laughable (see [85] for an instructive example), asking them what they thought the game was about (e.g.
[13,25]) and exploring what they found confusing. A.C.P. piloted her games; in her experience, pausing
to consider alternative framings and protocols after each pilot participant substantially improved the
comprehensibility of her game. If possible, we recommend piloting with members of a different
community, but one similar to the focal community in the parameters of interest (e.g. living in the same
region, growing the same crops, composed of people with similar ethnic backgrounds and similar rates
of migration, etc.). Piloting in the focal community may not be desirable if (i) you intend to interview
every household in the community (as did C.T.R. and M.M.G.), or (ii) you fear that participants may talk
to one another about your game before they play (A.C.P.’s concern; see [72,73] for similar concerns). Per
(ii), consider a pilot community that interacts infrequently with the focal community (A.C.P. picked
communities living on different roads in the same region).
4.4. What about replicability?
In the past decade, conversations about replicability have come to the forefront in the social sciences.
Replicability refers to whether an experimental result can be reproduced by other researchers who use
the same experimental protocol with a sample of individuals drawn from the same population [86];
different criteria can be used to establish replication, but under the least stringent criterion, a successful2Of course, such an approach requires some patience and an eye to ethics (see [84] for a helpful guide).
3We recommend reading the previous writings of ethnographers, and if possible, local community members themselves, describing the




12replication is one that finds effects in the same direction as those of the original experiment (see [87]
for examples).
Classical economic games have proven reliable and generally yield replicable results within Western
populations (e.g. [88]). They have also played a central role in some recent demonstrations that common
Dictator and Ultimatum Game findings from Western student samples do not replicate across populations
[31,60,89]. However, this failure to replicate has two interpretations. One is that the underlying phenomena,
for example private-world or real-world preferences, vary fundamentally across populations; we do not
doubt that there is genuine variation in the preferences underlying economic game play. That said, the
second interpretation is methodological: perhaps, the validity of economic games—especially games
featuring minimalistic instructions, anonymous recipients and money—is compromised in some
populations, such as those that are less market integrated and predominantly interact with known
individuals, not with strangers [11,13]. While designing games to enhance their local relevance, as we have
recommended here, may boost their ecological validity [16,74], these alterations undercut strict replicability.
Nonetheless, economic games tailored to particular contexts lend themselves to ‘conceptual replications’: if
researchers have an a priori reason to think that participants’ decisions will vary in a specific way, or will
not vary, across different contexts, these theoretical predictions can be rigorously tested by triangulation,
using slightly different methodological approaches across sites [90]. In other words, the economic games
we have described produce results that are generalizable in a qualitative, but not necessarily quantitative,
sense. At the same time, economic games can maximize other important domains of scientific research,
such as ecological validity (as discussed in §1; [6,8]), and construct validity (as discussed in §4.2; [78,84,90]).20905. Conclusion
Focused on standardization [9] and parallels to bargaining in market societies [2], classical economic
games will not map onto all real-world contexts or be comprehensible to all peoples. Nevertheless, by
selectively altering the design of economic games—such as their framing, the presence or absence of
anonymity, or the number of potential recipients—researchers can tailor this broad experimental
method to their questions and to the communities with whom they collaborate. Notably, economic
games can reveal individuals’ private, minimally constrained preferences, or their preferences given
real-world constraints; as our case study from Colombia illustrates, subtle changes in game design can
elicit one or the other. Researchers can be more confident they are tapping real-world, as opposed to
private-world, preferences if they explicitly include the focal context in the game design or
experimental framing, supplement experimental data with observational or survey data and include
post-experiment follow-up questions asking participants what they thought the game was about.
In §4, we provided recommendations for how and when to use economic games. There are situations
in which observational or survey-based methods may be more appropriate for answering research
questions, but economic games are especially useful for selectively relaxing real-world constraints to
reveal private preferences, and for studying rare social interactions that may not be salient during an
interview. Games tailored to research questions and to local research contexts can facilitate conceptual
replication, a component of larger replication efforts. Furthermore, pilot runs of games and the
inclusion of post-game questions can provide substantial qualitative data about local social
interactions and relationships, enhancing the insights that economic games provide.
As with all social science methods, economic games are not without their limitations, but many of
these limitations can be addressed with careful experimental design. While we do not recommend the
use of economic games in isolation, they can generate a great deal of value as part of a larger toolkit
deployed to investigate questions about human social behaviour and its variability.
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